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This article emphasizes the important interplay between politics and bureaucracy. It suggests that corruption risks are
lower when bureaucrats’ careers do not depend on political connections but on their peers. We test this hypothesis with
a novel measure of career incentives in the public sector—using a survey of more than 18,000 public sector employees
in 212 European regions—and a new objective corruption risk measure including over 1.4 million procurement
contracts. Both show a remarkable subnational variation across Europe. The study ﬁnds that corruption risks are
indeed signiﬁcantly lower where bureaucrats’ career incentives exclusively follow professional criteria. In substantial
terms, moving EU regions so that bureaucrats’ merit and effort would matter as much as in, for example, Baden-
Wüttemberg (90th percentile) could lead to a 13–20 billion Euro savings per year.Corruption is preventing prosperity across the globe.Analyzing causes of corruption has consequentlyattracted the attention of scholars of comparative
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substantial progress during the last two decades (see, e.g.,
Keefer 2007; La Porta et al. 1999; Persson and Tabellini
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Teorell 2012; Gingerich 2013; Miller and Whitford 2007;
Rauch and Evans 2000).
This article makes use of the subnational variation within
Europe, where there is an often ignored variation in cor-
ruption, prosperity, and health, as well as in cultural and
institutional factors. It provides an excellent opportunity for
testing comparative theories with new data.We compare 212
European regions using two unique data sets. On the inde-
pendent side, by measuring career incentives in the public
sector we develop a new, more experience-based measure
from a recent survey of over 18,000 public sector employees,
while we take advantage of a novel objective corruption risk
measure on the dependent side, based on over 1.4 million
public procurement contracts.
The article makes at least three contributions. First, al-
though there are important exceptions, most studies have
focused on political institutions (or on economic and cul-
tural factors) but have left bureaucracy out of the story.
While much has been learned about the political constraints
needed for good governance, and the economic and cultural
conditions often correlated with it, not assigning the bu-
reaucracy any agency in its own right is not only a misrep-
resentation of reality but comes with an obvious risk of
biased results. Second, those studies that have analyzed bu-
reaucratic institutions have, owing to data limitations, mainly
worked with aggregated data on the national level, often
entirely trusting perception-based measures (Dahlström et al.
2012; Rauch and Evans 2000). The perception-based mea-
sures have certainly been important for developing the ﬁeld,
but they have also suffered a great deal of criticism (An-
dersson andHeywood 2009; Kurtz and Schrank 2007). There
is a demand for more experience-based and objective mea-
sures of good governance and corruption, and this study
provides one such measure on the level of meritocracy and
one on corruption risks. Third, prevailing theories of insti-
tutional effects are often developed with a handful of coun-
tries in mind, and tested on more or less the same set of
countries, which violates basic advice in comparative social
science design (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Our focus
on a central aspect of bureaucratic institutions, namely, ca-
reer perspectives, and a research strategy that explores sub-
national variations address all these issues.
HOW MERITOCRACY AFFECTS CORRUPTION RISKS
This article investigates corruption risks on the grand level—
more speciﬁcally, the extent to which public positions can be
used to beneﬁt particular business interests (Rose-Ackerman
1999, chap. 3). We study public procurement processes andThis content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms try to assess why some ofﬁcials favor entrenched contractors,
while others assign public contracts more impartially. Our
analyses start from the research arguing that unconstrained
elites always have incentives to take advantage of their po-
sitions and enrich themselves and their clique at the expense
of general welfare (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fuku-
yama 2011; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Those who
have the greatest chances for corruption, and whose action
might have themost far-reaching consequences, are thus in a
constant “moral hazard” (Miller 2000, 289). However, the
large variations in corruption levels and welfare provision
worldwide suggest that such moral hazards can be handled
under the right circumstances.
A promising line of research has noted that the design
of bureaucratic staff might help to explain this variation.
Patronage-based systems where politicians appoint a large
number of public employees at will have been argued to be a
“necessary condition for the emergence of . . . particularistic
exchanges” such as corruption (Kopecký and Scherlis 2008,
357) and other “excesses” (Geddes 1991, 372). Although it
has recently been argued that bureaucrats directly respon-
sive to politicians are better at providing public goods (Nath
2015), analyses of very different countries have linked lower
levels of corruption and wasteful government spending to
higher levels of meritocracy (Dahlström et al. 2012; Kitschelt
and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001; Rauch and Evans 2000).
There are several mechanisms by which a merit-based
bureaucracy—as opposed to one where politicians appoint
employees at will—is expected to curb corruption. First,
merit-based employees may be less prone to corrupt be-
havior simply because, as argued by Weber ([1922] 1978q),
requiring a civil service exam or a university degree produces
a more capable pool of ofﬁcials (Rauch and Evans 2000). A
more competent staff is more likely to resist day-to-day
political pressures (Olsen 2006).
Second, even if they are not “better types” to start with,
bureaucrats improve motivation and performance by so-
cializing and internalizing the norms of good conduct of
their esprit de corps, when meritocracy and hard work,
rather than connections, are the key to a successful career in
the public sector (Rauch and Evans 2000). Unlike political
appointees, merit-recruited bureaucrats internalize rules of
what represents exemplary behavior (Olsen andMarch 2008).
These shared norms increase “the intangible costs of en-
gaging in deviant behavior like corrupt practices” (Hender-
son et al. 2007, 517) and “ensure responsible action even
when no one is watching” (Jos and Thompkins 2004, 256).
A third mechanism by which a meritocratic bureaucracy
constrains particularistic rent-seeking in the public sector is.184.102 on October 31, 2016 05:06:26 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 79 Number 1 January 2017 / 000by enlarging the time horizon of public employees. A mer-
itocratic bureaucracy is a “dramatic instance of deferred
compensation” (Miller 2000, 316) in which public employees
are rewarded for making a lifetime commitment to the
public administration that, in turn, encourages them to ne-
glect short-sighted and efﬁciency-undermining political pres-
sures (Gingerich 2013). A longer time horizon makes the
quick returns from corrupt deals less attractive (Olsen 2006).
In addition, the expectations of long-term careers encourage
more competent people to join the public sector and create a
virtuous spiral (Henderson et al. 2007).
Fourth and ﬁnally, the separation of careers between pol-
iticians and bureaucrats gives both types of actors stronger
incentives to engage in mutual monitoring, exposing each
other’s potentially corrupt activities, than would be the case
in a public administration ﬁlled with political appointees
(Dahlström et al. 2012). In the latter, ofﬁcials share a com-
mon interest in keeping the incumbent party in ofﬁce and
thus to turn a blind eye in case they suspect there is cor-
ruption. This mechanism echoes an idea according to which
countries with two veto players have lower levels of cor-
ruption than countries with only one veto player: collusive
behavior is more difﬁcult when decision makers have het-
erogeneous preferences (Andrews and Montinola 2004).
One can ﬁnd empirical illustrations of these mechanisms
linking meritocracy to low corruption both historically and
today. In the nineteenth century, British and US reformers
advocated separating the careers of politicians and bureau-
crats in order to minimize the morally hazardous behavior
prevalent in their highly politicized administrations. In Brit-
ain the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report promoted a mer-
itocratic administration (Greenaway 2004). And in the United
States, contemporary observers like William Clarke noted
that “as ofﬁcial patronage, either direct or indirect, is a great
if not perhaps the chief cause of corrupt elections, it logically
follows that the less patronage there is, the less corruption
there will be” (quoted in Frant 1993, 994). Consequently, pro-
gressive reformers sponsored civil service mechanisms aimed
at protecting the public workforce “from much of the day-
to-day political inﬂuence that was present in an earlier pe-
riod” (Miller 2000, 316).
Nowadays, the remarkable variation in corruption across
Spanish regions illustrates the connections between meri-
tocracy and corruption. On one side, there is a “tradition”
(Buck 2013) of politicians receiving bribes from construc-
tion tycoons and private contractors in many Spanish re-
gions, such as Valencia, Murcia, Madrid, and León (Kassam
2014), as well as in Catalonia (Hernández 2015). The mo-
dus operandi has been similar across all these regions: ﬁrmsThis content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms give a sum—generally around 3% of the public tender—to
politicians who, in turn, persuade civil servants to bend the
rules of the public tender offering so as to beneﬁt a certain
bidder.
Police and judicial investigations have documented the
key role played in these corruption scandals by public em-
ployees whose professional careers critically depended on
their political superiors. For instance, in Operación Gurtel,
where it is estimated that €449m were lost in a series of
corrupt public procurement contracts, many bureaucrats
realized the public contracts could be fraudulent and nev-
ertheless did not expose them (Olaya 2013). Testifying be-
fore court, several public employees acknowledged they were
told “which contractor must win” and, if they complained,
they were “threatened” with dismissal (Gürtel 2014). On
some occasions, the public employees were so concerned by
the “shoddy quality” of the materials used by the favored
contractor that they feared catastrophes could follow as a
result of the collapse of the public work; and yet the fear of
losing their job was so strong that public employees reported
neither to the media nor to judicial authorities (2014).
In sharp contrast to these Spanish regions stands the
Basque country, which ranks as Spain’s least corrupt region
in comparisons of European regions (Charron, Dijkstra, and
Lapuente 2015) and tops Transparency International’s rank-
ing of Spanish regions. One reason for the Basque country’s
performance may lie in the administrative reforms under-
taken in the region during the latest decades, which have
increased meritocracy and professionalism. Indeed, after the
Spanish transition to democracy in the late 1970s, the Basque
administration was “characterized by its politicization” (Llera
2000, 35). A pioneering comparative study of politicization
of regional administrations showed that the Basque admin-
istration was neither signiﬁcantly more nor less politicized
than other Spanish regions (Mesa 2000).
However, the Basque country has adopted a series of in-
stitutional changes that have distanced its administration
from those of other Spanish regions. Already in 1983 the
Basque country created an autonomous institution—the
Instituto Vasco de Adminstración Pública (IVAP)—to be in
charge of the selection of civil servants, which has over the
years contributed to generate a more autonomous bureau-
cracy (Hernández 2010). The Basque country has adopted
more measures devised at limiting at-will appointments at
the top of the administrative units, and both the Basque
regional administration and the Association of Basque Mu-
nicipalities have been forerunners in the adoption of Codes
of Ethics that promote impartial conduct and discourage
favoritism among their higher civil servants. These initia-.184.102 on October 31, 2016 05:06:26 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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served in the Basque country (Jiménez-Asensio 2013).
All in all, both theoretical accounts and empirical evi-
dence point at an association between the type of staff policy
prevalent in the bureaucracy (whether careers are dependent
on merit and hard work or on connections) and the levels of
corruption. We have highlighted four different mechanisms
that could causally link career structures to corruption. As
we will describe further in the next section, this article is
not designed to discriminate between these different mech-
anisms but rather to offer a comprehensive empirical test of
the relation between meritocracy and corruption, using new
and better data, that takes both cross-country and within-
country variation into account.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHOD
To the present, most analyses of corruption causes have been
national comparisons, and scholars are often forced to work
with perception-based measures, such as the well-known
“Control of Corruption” index from theWorld Bank and the
“Corruption Perceptions Index” of Transparency Interna-
tional. Although studies using these approaches have indeed
contributed extensively to the ﬁeld, they are limited by both
design and data. Cross-national comparisons of causes of
corruption have at least two, and sometimes three, problems
in common.
First, and perhaps most important, theories tested with
cross-national comparisons almost always draw information
initially from differences between the same countries.We are
certainly not saying that there is something wrong with de-
veloping theories inspired by empirical observations; that is
only natural, but as forcefully argued by King et al. (1994),
making theories less restrictive after empirical observations
in one data set requires new data in order for the theory to
be properly tested. It otherwise comes close to data ﬁtting,
which in turn increases the risk of omitted variable bias.
Second, there are good reasons to believe that within-
country differences are as important as between-country
differences. In Italy, for example, the northern regions re-
semble the best performing German Länder in factors such
as unemployment, per capita income, education, and cor-
ruption, while the southern regions look more like the lowest
performing countries in the European Union. Similarly large
differences can be found in Belgium, Spain, Romania, and
many other countries (Charron et al. 2015). In a worldwide
analysis explaining variation in economic development and
productivity, Gennaioli et al. (2011) ﬁnd that subnational
explanatory factors often trump national level factors. Cross-
national comparisons miss this variability as they trust theThis content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms less informative country mean and thus expose themselves
to what has been called the “whole nation bias” (Rokkan
1970). Snyder (2001) underscores that, as comparativists are
naturally limited by data availability, they need to increase
the number of cases as much as possible, and subnational
comparison offers a particularly promising avenue for do-
ing so.
Third, studies that use standard indicators of corruption
and good governance are also affected by the widely held
critique of these measures for being imprecise due to their
heavy dependence on perceptions. The standard request is to
take individual experiences and objective indicators of cor-
ruption into consideration to a greater extent andmove away
from perceptions (Andersson andHeywood 2009; Kurtz and
Schrank 2007).
This article speaks to these problems by analyzing sub-
national data, with newly collected data for both the de-
pendent and the independent variables. Our data allow us to
build a more experience-based measure of the career incen-
tives in the public sector on the independent side and a novel
objective corruption risk measure, based on over 1.4 million
public procurement contract awards, on the dependent side.
The next two sections describe these two data sets in detail.
However, before we discuss the data sets, we would like
to address a key issue in any analysis at the subnational level.
In countries such as Germany, Belgium, Italy, or Spain, local
constituents elect regional governments that are to some
degree autonomous in terms of forming their administration
while, in more politically centralized countries, such as Bul-
garia, Romania, Slovakia, or Portugal, the regions that we use
(so-called NUTS-1 and NUTS-2) are meaningful only in the
sense that EU development funds are targeted directly to
them and that Eurostat reports annual data on them. It can
therefore be argued that administrative and political re-
sponsibility varies too much. This study argues otherwise, in
that we attempt to capture all regional variation within a
country. This is defendable, we think, as scholars have noted
that the provision and quality of public services controlled by
a powerful central government can nonetheless largely vary
across different regions (Tabellini 2010). We will take this
potential objection to our data into special consideration in
our analysis, however, and rerun all models with only the
politically meaningful regions—for example, those with a
directly elected parliament at the level of analysis in our
study—in the sample.
Corruption risks
On the dependent side, this article uses public procurement
data to assess the risk of high-level corruption. It is the ﬁrst.184.102 on October 31, 2016 05:06:26 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
2. In the absence of company identiﬁers in the EU-wide public pro-
curement data set, we derived the cutoff of contract number by analyz-
ing the United Kingdom subsample where we manually assigned company
IDs by matching names and addresses to registry records. Cross-tabulating
number of contracts awarded on the market and the number of different
companies supplying the UK government shows that the number of mar-
kets with less than two companies drops below 5% among markets with at
Volume 79 Number 1 January 2017 / 000time this kind of data is used in an international comparative
context. The data contain information on individual public
procurement tenders that is regulated administrative pro-
cedures in which public bodies purchase goods and services
for the 28 EUmember states (EU28) between 2009 and 2013,
including, for example, contract value, the deadline for sub-
mitting bids, and the assessment criteria used. They derive
from the European Union’s Tenders Electronic Daily (http://
ted.europa.eu/), which is the mandatory online publication
that falls under the remit of the Public Procurement Di-
rective that aims to foster a single market in government
contracts. This means that large (both national and EU) con-
tracts are included in the database, with publication thresh-
olds varying over time while being approximately 125,000
Euro for service contracts and 4,000,000 Euro for public
works contracts. The database contains about 2.2 million
contracts awarded for the entire period; however, we used
data on only 1,403,939 contracts, excluding small countries
without a sufﬁcient number of contracts and dropping con-
tracts below the mandatory publication threshold. As a re-
sult, 26 EU member states (EU26) have indicators derived
from public procurement microdata.1 Similarly structured
and regulated public procurement data exist across the
globe, making ourmeasurement strategy generally replicable
outside Europe as well (http://ocds.open-contracting.org/).
The full contract-level public procurement database can be
downloaded at digiwhist.eu/resources/data.
Region-level procurement variables are deﬁned by ag-
gregating contracts awarded by local public bodies and agen-
cies, using information on the location of the contracting
entity. Corruption risk measurement solely builds on those
characteristics of the tendering processes that are in the
hands of the local contracting entities within the boundaries
of national and regional procurement laws, for example
deciding on the deadline for submitting bids (for full indi-
cator description see Fazekas-Kocsis 2015). While invest-
ments in a particular region by bodies located in another
region may also inﬂuence the corruption risk level of that
region, we focus only on the local decision-making powers
when we deﬁne regional corruption risk levels.
We capture high-level corruption risk at the regional
level. Our measures tap into a deliberate restriction of open
competition for government contracts in order to beneﬁt a
well-connected company, and we operationalize our depen-
dent variable in two ways, differing only in the number of
components included. To avoid distortion from less com-1. The data include all EU28 countries except Malta and Croatia.
This content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms petitive markets such as defense, the indicators are deﬁned
only when at least 10 contracts were awarded in 2009–13,
indicating a sufﬁcient demand for at least two operating
companies.2
First, the simplest indication of corruption risks is when
only one bid was submitted in a tender on an otherwise
competitive market. Hence, the percentage of single-bidder
contracts awarded in all the awarded contracts is the most
straightforward measure we use.
Second, our complex indicator also incorporates char-
acteristics of the procedure that are in the hands of public
ofﬁcials and suggests deliberate competition restriction. In
addition to the percentage of single-bidder contracts awarded,
the following process-related indicators of corruption risks
were included: (i) A restricted, nonopen tendering proce-
dure such as invitation tenders that are by default much less
competitive. Using less open and transparent procedure types
can indicate the deliberate limitation of competition, hence
corruption risks. (ii) The use of subjective, nonprice related
assessment criteria: different types of evaluation criteria are
prone to ﬁddling to different degrees, subjective, hard-to-
quantify criteria often accompany rigged assessment proce-
dures as they create room for discretion and limit account-
ability mechanisms. (iii) Very short advertisement period: if
the number of days between advertising a tender and the
submission deadline is too short to prepare an adequate bid,
it can serve corrupt purposes, whereby the issuer informally
tells the well-connected company about the opportunity well
ahead of time. (iv) A quick evaluation of bids: if the time used
for deciding on the bids submitted is excessively short or
lengthened by legal challenge, it can also signal corruption
risks. Snap decisions may reﬂect premeditated assessment,
while legal challenge and the corresponding long decision
period suggest an outright violation of laws. Each of these are
large and signiﬁcant predictors of single-bidder contract
awards when controlling for the sector of the contracting
entity (e.g., education, health), type of contracting entityleast 11 contracts awarded, with the average number of companies steadily
increasing as the number of contracts increase. Hence taking 10 contracts
per market is a conservative cut-point for identifying competitive markets
with multiple potential suppliers.
.184.102 on October 31, 2016 05:06:26 AM
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award, main product market of procured goods and services
(e.g., roads, training) and contract value. The average un-
weighted incidence of single bids received and the four pro-
cesses related to “red ﬂags” constitute a composite indicator:
the corruption risk index (0 ≤CRI ≤ 1, where 0pminimum
corruption risk and 1p maximum corruption risk).3
While the validity of both outcome measures predomi-
nantly stems from their ﬁt with the deﬁnition of high-level
corruption, their association with widely used survey-based
corruption indicators and further objective indicators of
corruption risks underpins their validity. As reported in
table 1, both corruption risk indicators (2009–13 averages
per NUTS region) correlate as expected with the European
Quality of Government Index (EQI), which to our knowl-
edge is the best regional measurement of institutional quality
and corruption, and to two subcomponents of the EQI,
corruption perceptions of public sector services and reported
public sector bribery.
To further explore the validity of our measure, we also
inspect two more objective micro-level risk indicators, namely
the procurement suppliers’ country of origin and contract
prices. First, it is expected that higher corruption risk con-
tracts are won by companies registered in tax havens as their
secrecy allows for hiding illicit money ﬂows (Shaxson and
Christensen 2014), which is shown in the case in ﬁgure 1.
Second, we expect corruption to drive prices up. A simplistic,
albeit widely used, indicator of price in the absence of reliable
unit prices is the ratio of actual contract value to initially
estimated contract value (Coviello-Mariniello 2014). As ex-
pected, both the single-bidder contract and CRI are associ-
ated with a higher price ratio. Single-bidder contracts are
associated with a 7% higher contract value, while contracts
with 1 CRI higher are associated with a 9% higher contract
value, both reported in table 2.
All in all, the validity checks strengthen our conﬁdence
that both our measures are indeed picking up high-level cor-
ruption risks.
Meritocratic career incentives in the public sector
The data on meritocracy in the public sector in this study are
taken from the largest multi-country survey that speciﬁcally
focuses on matters of governance and corruption—with a3. We ﬁnd that regional variation within countries is quite signiﬁcant.
Running empty hierarchical models (constant only) with random country
effects yield an interclass correlation of 0.70 and 0.65 for the single bidder
and combined index respectively, meaning that accounting for country-
level variation alone would overlook 30% and 35% of the total variation in
corruption risk in the sample (p ! .000 in both cases).
This content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms total sample of over 85,000 randomly selected respondents
18 years or older via the next birthday method in 24 Euro-
pean countries using computer-assisted telephone interview-
ing (CATI) to ensure uniformity. The survey is especially
suited for this analysis due to its regional focus (400–450
randomly selected respondents per region) and was mainly
concerned with European citizens’ perceptions and expe-
riences on the corruption, quality, and impartiality of re-
gional public service; the survey was conducted between
February and April 2013 by the authors in collaboration with
the EU Commission. The respondents were asked all ques-
tions in the majority language of their region or country and
were interviewed via telephone with a mix of landline and
mobile contacts, and the sampling frame was households
(for landlines) and individuals (for mobile phones). The
response rate was roughly 21%, a rate consistent with, or
higher than, many other large telephone-administered sur-
veys (Pew Research Center 2012).4 More details about the
survey are given in the appendix, available online, and in
Charron, Dahlström, and Lapuente (2016).
Measuring such independence directly is obviously a
challenge, and (like those before us) our measure is indi-
rect. However, on the continuum between perceptions and
experienced-based measures, ours certainly leans more to-
ward the latter, which is an improvement over measures
based solely on perceptions or the opinions of outside ex-
perts. We include only individuals with a direct experienceTable 1. Bivariate Pearson Correlation between
“Objective” Measures of Regional Corruption
and Survey-Based IndicatorsVariable4. While 21% might
shown that high respons
costs in obtaining them—
results from groups of r
similar ﬁndings.
.184.102 on October 31, 2
and Conditions (http://wwPercent
Single Bidderseem rather low,










bidder .69* 185Regional CRI .69* 185
EQI (2013) 2.61* 2.54* 185
Corruption
perception .55* .47* 185
Reported bribery .53* .59* 185Note. CRI p corruption risk index; EQI p European Quality of Gov-
ernment Index.





Volume 79 Number 1 January 2017 / 000of what they are answering; thus, we ﬁrst record if a re-
spondent answered that they were employed in the public
sector. In total, 18,335 respondents reportedly worked in the
public sector in some capacity. We then use a 10-scale ques-
tion asking what the respondent thinks is closest to her own
view: “in the public sector, most people can succeed if they
are willing to work hard” (1) or “hard work is no guarantee
of success in the public sector for most people—it’s more
a matter of luck and connections” (10). (See Charron et al.
[2016] for a more detailed discussion about the measure.)
Finally, we aggregate the scores by NUTS-1 and NUTS-2
region in each country, taking each region’s mean score and
its standard error. Overall, we ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcant
variation in how public sector employees view the road to
success in their ﬁeld, although respondents in themajority of
European regions tend to lean toward “luck and connec-
tions” (as indicated by a score greater than 50).We reverse the
scores and ﬁnd that the regional scores range from least mer-
itocratic, 1.7 (Belgrade Region, Serbia) and 2.1 in the rele-
vant sample (Severozapaden, Bulgaria), to most, 5.6 (South-
west England). Figure 2 shows the distribution by region in
the sample. Regions that are shaded lighter are considered
more meritocratic. We produce a 95% conﬁdence interval for
each region’s point estimate to show statistical signiﬁcance
from one region’s estimate to another.
Cross-country measures of public sector meritocracy are
scarce, especially at the regional level, and thus ﬁnding data
to assess external validity is somewhat of a challenge. How-
ever, cross-national measures of public sector impartiality
and professionalism, which is similar to our concept, are
available for all of the countries in our sample. These data are
based on expert survey data from the Quality of GovernmentThis content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Institute (Teorell, Dahlström, and Dahlberg 2011). In ag-
gregating our regional measure to the country level, we ob-
tain Spearman rank correlations of 0.76 (pp .000) and 0.80
(p p .000) between our measure and the expert survey
measures of impartiality and professionalism, respectively,
showing a strong degree of consistency between the two
sources.
Estimation techniques
Due to the nature of the data, a concern is our unit of
analysis (regions in countries). We ran a White-Koenker
test of heteroskadascitiy from bivariate corruption-career
models. These show signs of heteroskadasticity due to coun-
try clustering (p p .02), while in later models with more
control variables, the test shows stronger signs (p ! .01). This
issue leads to a second potential violation of OLS—that our
observations might not be independent due to the regionsFigure 1. Average corruption risks of public procurement suppliers registered abroad, EU26, 2009–2013, Ncontract p 14,909.Table 2. Linear Regression with Relative Contract Value,
EU26, 2009–13Independent Variable.184.102 on October 31, 2016 05:06:
and Conditions (http://www.journals.u(1)26 AM
chicago.edu/t-and-c).(2)Percent single bidder .071 (.000)
Regional CRI .090 (.000)
N 164,711 164,711
R2 .088 .086Note. Each regression controls the sector of the contracting entity, type of
contracting entity, year of contract award, country of contract award,
main product market of procured goods and services, and contract value.
CRI p corruption risk index.
6. Formally, our autoregressive measure “A” is constructed as:
000 / Careers, Connections, and Corruption Risks Nicholas Charron et al.being nested in countries. This implies that there are spatial
dependencies in the data and that the slope estimates; in
particular, the standard error can be biased due to issues of
group-wise heteroskadasticity. There is ongoing debate as to
how to model this issue, where several possibilities can be
considered (Bryan and Jenkins 2016; Goldstein 2011; Huang
2016): ﬁrst, clustered standard errors in normal or weighted
regression;5 second, ﬁxed effects models, which isolate the
variation of the variables within countries; third, random ef-
fects hierarchical models, which allow for random country
intercepts. On the basis of this and the nature of our data, we
take the country context into account via clustered (country)5. We experiment with two weights. First, since our regions are of
varying sizes, with some large (Catalonia, Bavaria, etc.) and some small
(Bolzano, Azures), we weight each region by its relative population
sample, giving more weight to regions with larger populations. Second, we
rerun models using the inverse of the standard error of the estimates of
meritocracy by region. Third, we rerun models without weights.
This content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms standard errors and run models with hierarchical estimation
(regions nested in countries). In addition, we also model di-
rectly the spatial dependence across units with several auto-
regressive models, accounting for corruption risk levels in
neighboring regions (Haining 2003). Essentially, we add an
extra parameter to thesemodels, which is a distance-weighted
function of the average neighboring corruption risk.6
Moreover, as the data are cross-sectional, we run an ob-
vious risk of endogenity between the two main variables. ToFigure 2. Career incentives for working hard in the public sector by European region. Scores have been reversed so that higher values equal greater merit.




where Yj is the value of corruption risk for i’s set of “ni” neighbors, and wij
is the weight given (in our case “1” for contiguous neighbor, “0” if oth-
erwise). We construct two measures using this formula, one that capture all
contiguous neighbors and one for only neighbors within region i’s country.
.184.102 on October 31, 2016 05:06:26 AM
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Volume 79 Number 1 January 2017 / 000deal with this issue, we also employ a two-stage least-squares
(2SLS) instrumental analysis in several models. While in-
struments are admittedly difﬁcult to ﬁnd, we explore two pos-
sibilities.
First are the literacy rates in 1880, which we argue would
be a determinant of the meritocracy in the bureaucracy to-
day. Hollyer (2011) argues that introducing civil service
reforms that separated bureaucratic and political careers was
only introduced when there was a pool of qualiﬁed candi-
dates. A country or region with lower literacy rates is thus
expected to have stronger incentives for rulers to introduce
meritocracy. Some readers might be skeptical of this in-
strument in that it determines corruption risk and hence
would be correlated with the unobserved variance.We argue,
however, that greater past literacy rates should not be di-
rectly correlated with current corruption risk levels but that
this relationship works through other channels, such as im-
proved bureaucratic independence (our hypothesis) or through
a conditional relationship, such as a free press. Theoretically,
there is nothing inherently benevolent about low literacy
rates, which could also increase the opportunity for more
people to cheat the system via forgery, for example. More-
over, cross-country data show that, while the least corrupted
countries in the world all have had near universal literacy for
decades, other countries considered highly corrupt, such as
post-Soviet Russia, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan have, for the entire postwar
era, also been some of the most highly literate places in the
world. In Africa, according to some of the latest data on
literacy and corruption, two of the most corrupt countries—
Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe—are also the most liter-
ate.7 Thus, at best there is an indirect relationship between
aggregate literacy and corruption, rendering this instrument
theoretically valid.8 In addition, past literacy rates have also
been used in previous empirical studies as an instrument for7. Using 2013 corruption data from Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index, the two countries rank in the bottom 5% in
the world, while the latest CIA World Factbook data note that Equatorial
Guinea and Zimbabwe have literacy rates of 95.3% and 90.5%, respec-
tively, the two highest on the continent.
8. In addition to our hypothesis, it is possible that literacy rates have a
conditional effect on corruption risk based on factors such as press free-
dom levels or democracy. The cross-national data cited here on literacy
and corruption risk suggest that, in the absence of either press freedom or
democracy, it is unlikely that literacy rates will have an effect on either
corruption risk or even meritocracy as it is conceived here. Our model
implies that, in democratic states with press freedom, the effect of literacy
on corruption risks channels through meritocracy in the bureaucracy. As
space is limited in this analysis, we leave more direct tests of these possible
interactions to future research.
This content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms testing cultural or institutional development (Charron and
Lapuente 2013; Tabellini 2010). However, it should be noted
that a debate exists in the literature regarding how past ed-
ucation levels affect current day corruption, with some ar-
guing the effect is more direct through other channels, such
as economic equality, which we control for (Uslaner and
Rothstein 2016).
Second, building on Weber ([1904] 2002), we use the
proportion of Protestant residents in a region as an instru-
ment for a more developed bureaucracy. Protestantism im-
plies a state church, which deprives the ruler the possibility
to use an outside organization, such as the Catholic church,
for provision of, for example, education and census, and in
turn increases incentives for early investments in a merit bu-
reaucracy. Evidence shows that, historically, counties in Ger-
many with higher concentrations of Protestantism have had
better education and human capital development (Becker
and Woessmann 2009). In addition, Tabellini (2010) uses
Protestantism in a sample of European regions as an in-
strument to explain beneﬁcial aspects of modern day culture,
which in turn lead to greater levels of economic develop-
ment.
In many cases, we have regional estimates for both liter-
acy rates and Protestantism. However, where we could not
ﬁnd statistics at the regional level, we employ country av-
erages. In addition, if we were able to control for corruption
at the time of our instrumental variables, then we would
signiﬁcantly increase the validity of the instruments. Yet cor-
ruption data do not go back this far, and we thus use the data
available, and this missing aspect is a shortfall in the esti-
mation. We provide several tests of instrumental validity in
these models. More detail on the two instrumental variables
is given in appendix C.9
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Although the main purpose of this article is to study impli-
cations of the suggestion made above, we also take into ac-
count explanations from comparative studies of control of
corruption that are reasonable at the regional level.
First, we follow authors who regard economic develop-
ment as a prerequisite for good government and low cor-
ruption. Different versions of this argument can be found in
the work of Boix and Stokes (2003), Lipset (1960), or Welzel
and Inglehart (2008). We control for the overall level of eco-9. We test whether the instrumental variables meet the exclusion re-
striction for valid instruments by including them in the main regression
model (model 8 in table 3), and we ﬁnd neither to be signiﬁcant when
including meritocracy.
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years in order to capture both the level and recent trends in
regional economic development. We take the purchasing
power per capita for the most recent year (2012) and the year
2000 (the year furthest back that is available) from Eurostat.
The growth rates are taken over this period.
Second, we follow a large body of literature on trust and
good government that has found how low-corruption coun-
tries (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Zack and Knack 2001) and
low-corruption regions (Putnam 1993; Tabellini 2010) tend
to have populations with high levels of social capital. We take
the average degree of generalized trust into account from a
recent study by Charron and Rothstein (2014). The level of
civic participation is captured via rates of electoral turnout for
the latest regional level election (where applicable).
Third, since the accumulation of political power has been
noted as being important for understanding corruption (An-
drews andMontinola 2004), we control for ﬁve variables used
in previous regional studies of corruption (Charron and La-
puente 2013): (i) the fractionalization of a region’s parlia-
ment, (ii) the proportion of years a region has been governed
by a single party, (iii) whether the region has a minority gov-
ernment, (iv) how long the current party or coalition has
been in power, and (v) the electoral threshold that acts as an
entry barrier for new political competitors at the regional
level.
Fourth, although the causal relationship is debated, coun-
tries with higher levels of income/wealth inequality tend on
average to have higher corruption (Jong-sung and Khagram
2005). We use a Theil index of inequality of wages in six sec-
tors of employment with the latest regional data (2010) from
Galbraith and Garcilazo (2005) and the percentage of resi-
dents at risk for poverty by region in 2012 (Eurostat).
Fifth, several studies have looked at gender inequalities
and corruption levels and found strong correlations among
these two factors (Wängnerud 2009), pointing out that greater
levels of participation of women equate with lower levels of
corruption (Swamy et al. 2001). We control for the per-
centage of women in a region’s parliament taking data from
Sundström (2013).
Sixth, and ﬁnally, we control for a geopolitical factor—
whether the region is the country’s capital—and demo-
graphic factors—such as the region’s population and pop-
ulation density, taken from Eurostat.
In some cases (data from ESS, women in parliament,
Theil measure of wage inequality), the NUTS regions pro-
vided did not correspond to those in our data for all coun-
tries. In all cases, the NUTS regions from other sources were
lower (smaller regions); thus, we aggregated from NUTS-2This content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms to NUT-1 or NUTS-3 to NUTS-2 using regional population
weights taken from Eurostat.
RESULTS
We begin by looking at the bivariate relationship between
meritocracy in the public sector and corruption, which is
relatively strong. The bivariate correlations with our mea-
sures of the dependent variables are signiﬁcantly correlated
in the expected direction with career independence (p ≤ .000).
We provide scatterplots in appendix B showing that, on av-
erage, regions with greater meritocracy are associated with
lower corruption.
We include control variables, reported in table 3, one at a
time, and then ﬁnish with two full models (models 8 and 9).
The “percent single bidder” is used in all models as the de-
pendent variable, whereas our other measure (CRI) is found
together with a third measure for robustness (percentage of
self-reported bribery by region) in appendix B.
The level of meritocracy is a strong predictor of corrup-
tion risks in European regions, irrespective of the estimation
method or control variables. A one-unit increase in mer-
itocracy decreases corruption risk by between2.09 (model 8)
and 2.14 (model 1). The effect is signiﬁcant above the 99%
conﬁdence level in all models. See table 4 for a more concrete
interpretation, which elucidates the marginal effects of mer-
itocracy on corruption from the most conservative estimate
(model 8). We highlight predicted levels of corruption at the
minimum value, 25th percentile, mean, 75th percentile, and
max levels of meritocracy, along with standard errors and
conﬁdence intervals. The model indicates that the lowest
levels of corruption differ signiﬁcantly frommean values and
above. The 75th percentile is distinguishable from both the
mean and high values.
A min-max change in career independence is associated
with a decrease in 17 times fewer single-bid procurement
contracts in a region (0.34 to 0.02), while moving from the
25th to 75th percentile reduces single bids by almost half.
This is reported in table 4. There are many examples of such
a difference in the sample. Compare, for example, meritoc-
racy between the German states of Thuringia (3.84) and
Hamburg (5.17), the former having more than twice the
corruption risk of the latter (0.11 to 0.05), or in Spain, the
difference between Andalucía (3.72) and Navarre (4.96),
which shows a difference in the percent of single bidders of
0.14 (0.18 to 0.04).
It is possible to translate these regression results into es-
timated savings for governments. Moving all regions to the
90th percentile of meritocracy which are below this thresh-
old, that is, making them similar to Yorkshire-Humber or.184.102 on October 31, 2016 05:06:26 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 79 Number 1 January 2017 / 000Baden-Wüttemberg, would decrease procurement costs by
roughly 0.5%–0.8% across Europe: that is, a 13–20 billion
EUR savings per year for the whole European Union in 2010
prices (meritocracy effects derive from models 1 and 8 in
table 3, price effect from model 1 in table 2).
Regarding the control variables in table 3, we ﬁnd that
greater levels of recent and past levels of economic devel-
opment (purchasing power parity [PPP] per capita) are sig-
niﬁcant predictors of less regional-level corruption, but,
while recent growth levels are in the expected direction, their
effects are not distinguishable from zero in model 4. We ﬁndThis content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms that greater levels of non-EU born residents are associated
with less corruption in model 5, yet this effect falls below
acceptable signiﬁcance levels in model 8. Regions with
higher levels of social trust also tend to have less risk for
corruption on average, and the effect is signiﬁcant at the 95%
conﬁdence interval in model 8. Another strong predictor of
corruption levels is gender equality in terms of the percent-
age of women in the subnational parliament—we ﬁnd that,
for each percent increase, the risk of corruption decreases by
2% (model 6), and while the effect remains signiﬁcant, it
decreases by 10-fold in the full model 8. Other factors suchTable 3. The Effect of Meritocracy in the Public Sector on CorruptionVariable 1 2 3 4.184.102
and Con5 on October 31
ditions (http://w6, 2016 05:06:
ww.journals.726 AM
uchicago.edu/8t-and-c).9Meritocracy 2.14** 2.12** 2.11** 2.13** 2.10** 2.12** 2.12** 2.09** 2.10**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)Pop. density (log) 2.001 2.002
(.005) (.004)Capital region 2.04 2.001
(.02) (.04)PPP 2011 (log) 2.06* 2.03 2.06
(.03) (.04) (.04)PPP 2000 (log) 2.05*
(.02)PPP growth (2000–2011) .0003
(.0003)Percent non-EU born 2.003** 2.001
(.001) (.001)Social trust 2.14 2.17* 2.02
(.08) (.07) (.11)Wage ineq. (Theil) 2.73 .58
(1.39) (1.11)Percent women parliament 2.02* 2.002* 2.004
(.001) (.001) (.007)Party fractionalization .03 .02
(.12) (.11)Voter turnout 2.002 2.001
(.001) (.01)Constant .74** 1.29** 1.11** .68** .68** .73** .72** .96* 1.23*
(.08) (.27) (.22 (.08) (.06) (.07) (.15) (.36) (.48)No observations 185 185 185 185 181 182 127 180 122
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 20 10
R² .50 .52 .52 .49 .55 .51 .44 .57 .46
Mean VIF 1.05 1.22 1.33 1.26 1.29 1.20 1.29 2.03 2.05Note. Dependent variable is the percent of single bidders. WLS estimation with robust cluster (country) standard errors in parentheses. Observations are
weighted by population. VIF is the mean variance inﬂation factor, which displays the extent to which multicollinearity might affect the efﬁciency of a given
model. Models 7 and 9 are run with “politically relevant” regions only, hence the drop in observations. PPP p purchasing power parity; VIF p variance
inﬂation factor; WLS p weighted least squares.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
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turnout, or party fractionalization do not demonstrate sig-
niﬁcant effects on corruption whenmeritocracy is accounted
for.
For robustness and model checks, the effects are also con-
sistent irrespective of the measure of corruption used (see
app. B for results for the CRI and bribery measures). Whether
including all regions or only politically relevant ones also plays
no role in our main ﬁndings. As several of the explanatory
variables correlate between 0.4 and 0.5 with our meritocracy
measure (in particular, PPP per capita and social trust), we
include the variance inﬂation factor (VIF) for every model to
show the extent to which multicollinearity might have an
impact on the efﬁciency of the estimates. In none of the cases
do we observe a serious problem. Finally, all models in table 3
are rerun using the multilevel modeling (MLM) estimation,
and the full model is rerun removing all outlier regions.10 No
signiﬁcant differences are observed in the results.
To address the potential issues of endogenity, table 5
reports models using a 2SLS speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst three
models in table 5 are weighted least squares (WLS) regres-
sions with country clustered standard errors and no controls,
and they highlight the relationship between the instrumental
variables—past literacy rates and proportion of Protestant-
ism—with meritocracy in the public sector. Both are in the
expected direction; they are signiﬁcant at the 99% level of
conﬁdence and remain signiﬁcant when included together in
model 3.
Models 4 and 5 try to isolate the exogenous effects of
meritocracy on corruption risks with the use of a 2SLS IV10. Regions having greater than 4/n on the Cook’s D statistic are
deﬁned as outliers. We identify 10 outlying regions and rerun the models
without them. The regions are GR2, IE02, ITE2, ITF2, PL62, RO32, FR10,
PT15, PT30, and SK01.
This content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms regression for both our measures of corruption. These
models also include control variables (not shown). We ﬁnd
that the effects of meritocracy on both procurement and
bribery are remarkably robust to this estimation. Thus we
alleviate some concerns that meritocracy in the public sector
is endogenous to corruption, that both proxy for a salient
omitted variable, and even that our indicators are measured
with a sufﬁciently damaging level of error.
However, this conclusion is only correct if instruments
are valid. For an instrument to be valid, it must be correlated
with the endogenous variable (meritocracy), but not with the
error term in the second stage estimations for corruption
when the other regressors are controlled for in the model.
The ﬁrst-stage F test in models 4 and 5 shows that the in-
struments are strongly relevant (the rule of thumb is an F
statistic 110). The Kleibergen-Paap test shows that our
model is not underidentiﬁed, while the Hanson’s J-statistic,
which tests the correlation between the instruments and the
second stage error term, shows that the instruments are
statistically valid.
Thus far, we have accounted for several factors associated
with corruption on a regional level, but some factors from
the literature are difﬁcult to disaggregate from the country
level with existing data. For example, Brunetti and Weder
(2003) point to the level of press freedom being negatively
associated with corruption, while Keefer (2007) highlights
the effects of the age of a country’s democratic institutions as
affecting the level of corruption, and much debate has cen-
tered around the effects of ethnic diversity and corruption
(Alesina et al. 2003). Table 6 therefore focuses on the factors
that were not accounted for in the regional level analysis,
such as age of democracy, freedom of the press, and ethnic
heterogeneity (data from Teorell et al. 2013).
All models include controls at the regional level, and each
country level factor is taken one at a time, building up to the
full model in models 7 and 8. The ﬁndings here corroborate
several previous studies—regions in countries with a longer
history of democracy and higher levels of press freedom
tend, on average, to have lower corruption, while states that
are more ethnically diverse tend to have regions with higher
levels of corruption. In none of these models does the impact
of career independence on corruption fall from signiﬁcance,
demonstrating strong and robust evidence for our hypoth-
esis. There is also little residual variance of the dependent
variable at the country level relative to the regional level, in
particular when the three country level factors are included,
again highlighting the relevance of the regional level of anal-
ysis, which supports using the region as the primary unit of
analysis. Finally, we ﬁnd the results robust to our other mea-
sure of corruption (app. B), as well as when we model directlyTable 4. Marginal Effect of Careers on Corruption as
Measured by Single Bidding—from Full Model with ControlsMeritocracy
Predicted
CorruptionStandard
Error 95% CIMin .34 .05 .24 .43
25th percentile .21 .02 .17 .25
Mean .17 .01 .14 .19
75th percentile .12 .01 .10 .13
Max .02 .01 2.03 .08Note. Marginal effects calculations from post-estimation command mar-
gins in STATA. Estimates from model 8 (full model) are found in this table.
Predicted corruption is the proportion of predicted single bidders. CI p
conﬁdence interval..184.102 on October 31, 2016 05:06:26 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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available online).
CONCLUSIONS
This article explores corruption risks in public procurement
processes across Europe. We document a large variation in
corruption risks among 212 European regions using a novel
objective measure, based on the analysis of over 1.4. million
procurement contracts. The measure avoids the problems of
the perception-based measures of corruption generally em-
ployed in the literature. In addition, we have linked this var-
iation to the extent to which bureaucrats’ careers in the region
depend on merits and hard work or, in contrast, on the bu-
reaucrats’ political connections, using a pioneering measure
of meritocracy based on the self-reported experience with
meritocracy of over 18,000 public sector employees. The study
reported here is probably the most comprehensive test of the
often suggested positive effects of a meritocratic bureaucracy.This content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Previous studies that test the relationship between meri-
tocracy in the public sector have either been case studies or
pure theoretical work, or have employed experts’ views of
meritocracy and perception-based measures of corruption
(Miller 2000; Rauch and Evans 2000).
The empirical analysis given in this article has indeed
shown that, controlling for the usual confounders suggested
in the corruption literature, making bureaucrats less reliant
on political connections reduces the risks of corruption. We
have also tried to isolate the exogenous effects of merit and
hard work on corruption risks with the help of two instru-
ment variables (past literacy rates and Protestantism), and
our indicators show remarkably robust effects. Conversely,
where bureaucrats’ career incentives exclusively follow
professional criteria, we ﬁnd the lowest levels of risk of
corruption.
These ﬁndings have several implications. First, reformers’
proposals against corruption tend to be aimed at increasingTable 5. IV Regression Estimates (2SLS) for Two Measures of Corruption RisksDV, Meritocracy.184.102 on
and Conditio October 31, 201
ns (http://www.jDV, Corruption1 2 3 Single Bids6 05:06:26 AM
ournals.uchicago.edu/CRIMeritocracy 2.15** 2.05**
(.03) (.02)Past literacy .01** .01**
(.002) (.002)Protestantism 2.60** 1.86**
(.57) (.64)Constant 3.41** 3.87** 3.54**
(.15) (.14) (.14)No. obs. 183 185 179 175 175
Countries:R² .31 .35 .43 .55 .54
Uncentered R² .88 .97
1st stage F test 23.2** 23.2**
Kleibergen-Paap (x²) 18.3** 18.3**
Hanson J test (x²) (p-value) .73 .28Note. In models 1–3, OLS with country clustered standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variable is meritocracy.
Models 4 and 5 use the two measures of corruption as the dependent variable and include population density (log), PPP per
capita (2011, log), social trust, percent of women in parliament and robust standard errors in parentheses. In models 4 and 5,
meritocracy is modeled as the endogenous regressor with literacy and Protestantism as exogenous instruments. Regions
weighted by population. Relevance of the instruments with meritocracy is tested with the ﬁrst-stage F test (Ho: instruments
are weakly identiﬁed). The Kleibergen-Paap (x²) test tests whether the equation is properly identiﬁed (Ho: model is un-
deridentiﬁed). The Hanson J statistic tests whether the instruments are valid, e.g., uncorrelated with the error term in the
second stage (Ho: instruments are valid, p-values reported). CRIp corruption risk index; DVp dependent variable; OLSp
ordinary least squares; PPP p purchasing power parity.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.t-and-c).
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the introduction of open-list electoral systems and party
primaries in corruption-ridden countries (Buck 2013). Like-
wise, the massive anticorruption rallies that have taken place
since 2011 in Greece, Spain, Italy, Israel, India, Brazil, Mex-
ico, Chile, Guatemala, and Honduras, among other coun-
tries, demand “real democracy” and have improved account-
ability for a class of political representatives that are seen as
beneﬁting special business interests (Kulish 2011). Never-
theless, in light of the results presented in this article, there
are good reasons for proposing reforms that focus on the
accountability of nonpolitical public ofﬁcials. How we select
bureaucrats, and which career incentives the structure givesThis content downloaded from 131.111
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms them, are of critical importance for understanding corrup-
tion. In particular, the implication of our ﬁndings is that
reforms should be aimed not at making bureaucratic agents
as responsive as possible to their political principals but,
quite the contrary, at making them autonomous.
Second, shifting from a staff policy mostly based on at-
will political appointments to one based on merit criteria
would probably also lead to notable efﬁciency gains. The ef-
fects identiﬁed in this article are substantial. For instance,
moving all regions below the 90th percentile of meritocracy
to that threshold—that is, making them similar to Yorkshire-
Humber or Baden-Wüttemberg—would lower corruption
risks by 7.5 to 11.6 percentage points in terms of single-Table 6. Effect of Career Independence on Corruption Accounting for Country Level FactorsVariable 1 2 3a4.184.102 on O
nd Condition5ctober 31, 2016 05
s (http://www.journ6:06:26 AM
als.uchicago.7edu/t-and-c).8Meritocracy 2.06** 2.06** 2.09** 2.09** 2.07** 2.07** 2.05* 2.05*
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01)Country level
variables:Years of democracy 2.002** 2.002** 2.002* 2.002*
(.0004) (.0004) (.001) (.001)Ethnic
fractionalization .002 .002 .004* .004**(.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
Press freedom .006** .006* .005* .005*(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)








(2.89e211)Sd (residual) .07 (.045) .08 (.05) .07 (.01) .07 (.04)
Obs 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
R² .60 .57 .65 .67
Wald model test
Pr(x²) 333.4 2,772.9 227.2 1,348.6
Log likelihood
(iteration 0) .911 .869 .966 1.006
Log likelihood 1.129 1.083 1.180 1.221
Estimation method MLM WLS MLM WLS MLM WLS MLM WLSNote. The dependent variable is the percent of single bidders. All models include (not shown): PPP per capita (logged, 2011), social trust, population density
(logged) and percent of women in parliament. Other regional level variables from table 4 were dropped due to insigniﬁcance. WLS estimation reports
country clustered, robust standard errors in parentheses; in such models the regional level observations are weighted by the population. MLM is estimated
with the same regional controls as the WLS models and allows for random country intercepts. Units weighted by population and country-clustered standard
errors are in parentheses. MLM p multilevel modeling; PPP p purchasing power parity; WLS p weighted least squares.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
Volume 79 Number 1 January 2017 / 000bidding incidence. In turn, this would decrease procurement
costs by roughly 0.5 to 0.8 percentages across Europe, which
is equal to 13–20 billion EUR savings per year in 2010 prices.
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